A U.S. SECRET SERVICE ANALYSIS OF PLOTS AGAINST SCHOOLS 2021

PUBLISHED
JULY
2020
U.S. DEPAR TMENT OF HOMEL AND SECURIT Y
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
NAT I O N A L T H R E AT A S S E S S M E N T C E N T E R
Averting Targeted School Violence
A U.S. SECRET SERVICE ANALYSIS OF
PLOTS AGAINST SCHOOLS
2021

NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT CENTER
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
March 2021
This publication is in the public domain. Authorization to copy and distribute this publication in whole or in part is granted. However, the U.S. Secret Service star insignia may
not be otherwise reproduced or used in any other manner without advance written permission from the agency. While permission to reprint this publication is not necessary,
when quoting, paraphrasing, or otherwise referring to this report, the citation should be: National Threat Assessment Center. (2021). Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S.
Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools. U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security.
This report was authored by the following staff of the U.S. Secret Service
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC)
Diana Drysdale, M.A.
Supervisory Social Science Research Specialist
Ashley Blair, M.A.
Lead Social Science Research Specialist
Arna Carlock, Ph.D.
Social Science Research Specialist
Aaron Cotkin, Ph.D.
Social Science Research Specialist
Brianna Johnston, M.A.
Social Science Research Specialist
Steven Driscoll, M.Ed.
Supervisory Social Science Research Specialist
David Mauldin, M.S.W.
Social Science Research Specialist
Jeffrey McGarry, M.A.
Social Science Research Specialist
Jessica Nemet, M.A.
Social Science Research Specialist
Natalie Vineyard, M.S.
Social Science Research Specialist
Lina Alathari, Ph.D.
Chief
Special thanks to the following for their contributions to the project:
Chris Foley, M.S.S.W.
Assistant to the
Special Agent in Charge - NTAC
Peter Langman, Ph.D.
Psychologist and Author
RAND Corporation
Homeland Security Operational
Analysis Center
NTAC’s regional representatives:
Michael Kapuscinski
Domestic Security
Strategist,
Region 1 - NTAC
Katie Lord
Domestic Security
Strategist,
Region 2 - NTAC
Lisa Domier
Domestic Security
Strategist,
Region 3 - NTAC
Arlene Macias
Domestic Security
Strategist,
Region 4 - NTAC
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DIRECTOR’S MESSAGEEvery day, the Secret Service employs threat assessment methodologies as part of our
protective mission. The agency’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) applies those
methodologies to expand the research into the broader field of violence prevention.
This work involves closely examining targeted violence impacting communities across
the United States. For more than 20 years, NTAC has maintained a particular focus
on preventing targeted school violence by assembling a multidisciplinary team of
behavioral experts and engaging with state and local leaders throughout the country.
Our longstanding, collaborative partnerships with these members of the community are
invaluable to enhancing public safety and strengthening the security of our schools. The
following report builds upon previous research findings that indicate targeted school
violence is preventable.
In this most recent study, Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools,
NTAC examined 67 disrupted plots against K-12 schools from 2006-2018. The key findings of the study are clear and
consistent: Individuals contemplating violence often exhibit observable behaviors, and when community members
report these behaviors, the next tragedy can be averted. The Secret Service encourages its educational, medical and
public safety partners to review the information within, and use it to guide best practices for maintaining a safe and
healthy learning environment for all children.
For over 120 years, the men and women of the Secret Service have faithfully conducted our integrated mission of
protecting the country’s leaders and nationally significant facilities and special events, and securing our financial
infrastructure and payment systems. In doing so, important lessons have been learned and best practices have been
established. By applying these lessons, the Secret Service will continue coordinating with our community partners to
work toward ending targeted violence at schools and protecting our children.
James M. Murray
Director
The U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) was created in 1998 to provide guidance on threat assessment both within the U.S. Secret Service and to
others with criminal justice and public safety responsibilities. Through the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Congress formally authorized NTAC to conduct research
on threat assessment and various types of targeted violence; provide training on threat assessment and targeted violence; facilitate information-sharing among agencies
with protective and/or public safety responsibilities; provide case consultation on individual threat assessment investigations and for agencies building threat assessment
units; and develop programs to promote the standardization of federal, state, and local threat assessment processes and investigations.Averting Targeted School Violence:
A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 3
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................8
Part I: Overview of the Plots ................................................................................................ 9
School Characteristics ..................................................................................................................9
Plotter Demographics ............................................................................................................... 11
Motives ........................................................................................................................................... 12
Planning ......................................................................................................................................... 15
Plot Elements ............................................................................................................................... 19
Plot Detection & Reporting ..................................................................................................... 25
Responding to the Reports ..................................................................................................... 32
Part II: Plotters’ Backgrounds ............................................................................................34
Disciplinary History .................................................................................................................... 34
Prior Law Enforcement Contact............................................................................................. 35
Mental Health and Substance Use ....................................................................................... 36
Stressors ......................................................................................................................................... 39
Bullying........................................................................................................................................... 41
Concerning Communications ................................................................................................ 42
Interest in Violence..................................................................................................................... 43
Concerned Others ...................................................................................................................... 44
Judicial Outcome ........................................................................................................................ 46
Part III: Implications ............................................................................................................49
Part IV: Statistics and Comparison ...................................................................................54Averting Targeted School Violence:
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Executive Summary
THREAT ASSESSMENT IS THE BEST PRAC TICE for preventing targeted school violence. The averted attacks in this report
confirm what the National Threat Assessment Center’s (NTAC) research has found on school attacks, specifically that
students display a variety of observable concerning behaviors as they escalate toward violence. In order to identify,
assess, and intervene with students who may pose a risk of harm to themselves or others, schools and communities
should develop multidisciplinary threat assessment programs, as outlined in NTAC’s Enhancing School Safety Using a
Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence.1 This strategic approach
should be guided by the research findings contained in this report, along with NTAC’s 2019 examination of school
attacks that occurred from 2008 to 2017, titled Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted
School Violence.2
When conducted properly, a threat assessment will involve providing robust interventions and support for students
experiencing distress, thereby intervening with and de-escalating situations before they become violent. It should
be noted clearly in any school threat assessment policy that the primary objective of a student threat assessment is
not to administer discipline or to introduce students into the criminal justice system. While those responses may be
necessary at times, especially in situations involving explicit threats, violence, or weapons, the primary objective of a
student threat assessment should be providing a student with help and working to ensure positive outcomes for the
student and the community.Averting Targeted School Violence:
A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools
Averting Targeted School Violence | 3LIMITED TO OPEN SOU RC E I N F O R MAT I O N

Prevention and early intervention are paramount. The analysis of 67 averted school attack plots contained in this
report demonstrates that there are almost always intervention points available before a student’s behavior escalates
to violence. Students who plotted school attacks shared many similarities with students who perpetrated school
attacks. Both U.S. Secret Service studies, Protecting America’s Schools and Averting Targeted School Violence, included
students who:
• Had histories of school discipline and contact with law enforcement.
• Experienced bullying or had mental health issues, frequently involving depression and suicidality.
• Intended or committed suicide as part of the school attack.
• Used drugs or alcohol.
• Had been impacted by adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), including substance abuse in the home, violence or
abuse, parental incarceration, or parental mental health issues. Research from the CDC associates these types of
ACEs with a range of health, social, and behavioral problems throughout life.3
Based on the current study examining disrupted plots, and building on NTAC’s 20-year history of studying targeted
school violence, the following operational implications should be considered when developing policies and protocols
for multidisciplinary school threat assessment teams.
• Targeted school violence is preventable when communities identify warning signs and intervene.
In every case, tragedy was averted by members of the community coming forward when they observed behaviors
that elicited concern.
• Schools should seek to intervene with students before their behavior warrants legal consequences. The
primary function of a threat assessment is not criminal investigation or conviction. Communities should strive to
identify and intervene with students in distress before their behavior escalates to criminal actions.
• Students were most often motivated to plan a school attack because of a grievance with classmates.
Like students who perpetrated school attacks, the plotters in this study were most frequently motivated by
interpersonal conflicts with classmates, highlighting a need for student interventions and de-escalation programs
targeting such issues.
• Students are best positioned to identify and report concerning behaviors displayed by their classmates.
In this study, communications made about the attack plot were most often observed by the plotter’s friends,
classmates, and peers. Schools and communities must take tangible steps to facilitate student reporting when
classmates observe threatening or concerning behaviors. Unfortunately, many cases also involved students
observing concerning behaviors and communications without reporting them, highlighting the ongoing need for
further resources and training for students.
KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONSAverting Targeted School Violence:
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• The role of parents and families in recognizing concerning behavior is critical to prevention. Eight plots in
this study were reported by family members, illustrating the crucial role families can play in addressing a student’s
risk of causing harm. In some cases, other parents in the school community received concerning reports about a
classmate from their children, then passed the information on to the school or law enforcement. When identifying
and assessing concerning student behavior, a collaborative process involving parents or guardians is ideal. Families
should be educated on recognizing the warning signs and the supports and resources available to address their
concerns, whether in the school or the greater community.
• School resource officers (SROs) play an important role in school violence prevention. In nearly one-third of the
cases, an SRO played a role in either reporting the plot or responding to a report made by someone else. In eight
cases, it was the SRO who received the initial report of an attack plot from students or others, highlighting their role
as a trusted adult within the school community.
• Removing a student from school does not eliminate the risk they might pose to themselves or others. Five
plotters in this study were recently former students who had left school within one academic year of the plot, as they
had been expelled, enrolled in other schools, graduated, or stopped attending classes. This indicates that simply
removing a student from the school, without appropriate supports, may not necessarily remove the risk of harm they
pose to themselves or others.
• Students displaying an interest in violent or hate-filled topics should elicit immediate assessment and
intervention. Consistent with prior NTAC research studying school attackers, many of the plotters in this study
displayed such interest, particularly in the Columbine High School attack. Nearly one-third of the plotters conducted
research into prior mass attackers as part of their planning. Nine also displayed interest in Hitler, Nazism, and/or
white supremacy.
• Many school attack plots were associated with certain dates, particularly in the month of April. Some plotters
selected dates to emulate notorious people or events, such as the anniversary of the Columbine attack on April
20th, while others chose their dates to coincide with the beginning or end of the school year. School and security
professionals should approach these dates with extra consideration.
• Many of the student plotters had access to weapons, including unimpeded access to firearms. Threat
assessments must examine a student’s access to weapons, particularly those in the home. Similar to school attackers,
in most of the cases where plotters intended to use firearms, they had unimpeded access to them (e.g., they owned
them or their parents allowed access). In seven cases, the plotters acquired secured firearms because they were given
access to the safe, pried the safe open, found the key, or stole them when they were left out.LIMITED TO OPEN SOURC E I N F O R MAT I O N
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Introduction
Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model (2018)
STEP 1: Establish a multidisciplinary threat assessment team
STEP 2: Define prohibited and concerning behaviors
STEP 3: Establish and provide training on a central reporting system
STEP 4: Determine the threshold for law enforcement intervention
STEP 5: Establish assessment procedures
STEP 6: Develop risk management options
STEP 7: Create and promote a safe school climate
STEP 8: Provide training for all stakeholders
THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE has long held that threat assessment is the best practice for preventing acts of violence directed
at the president and other public officials the agency is mandated to protect. Threat assessment is an investigative
approach to identifying and intervening with individuals who may pose a risk of causing harm, and the Secret Service
considers threat assessment to be as important as the physical security measures the agency employs.
Through the pioneering research of the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC), this proactive
approach to violence prevention has been adapted to prevent other forms of targeted violence that impact communities
across the United States. For over 20 years, NTAC has closely examined attacks that target the places we work, learn,
worship, and otherwise live our daily lives. Within this field of study, the Secret Service prioritizes research and training
focused on the safety of children in America’s schools.
These efforts began with the publication of the Safe School Initiative (2002), which examined incidents of targeted
school violence that occurred from 1974 to 2000. The study, and accompanying guide, provided a blueprint for schools
to establish threat assessment programs for the purposes of early intervention and prevention. NTAC’s Bystander Study
(2008) showed that classmates and peers are most often the ones with knowledge about a student planning an attack,
and it highlighted the importance of promoting safe school climates that empower students and encourage reporting.
In 2018, NTAC provided further guidance to schools nationwide on how to develop targeted violence prevention
programs with Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing
Targeted School Violence. The guide outlines eight actionable steps schools can use to help identify students of concern,
gather information to assess risk, and provide robust management strategies to ensure positive outcomes for the student
and community.Averting Targeted School Violence:
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Protecting America’s Schools (2019)
• There is no profile of a student attacker, nor
is there a profile for the type of school that
has been targeted.
• Attackers usually had multiple motives,
the most common involving a grievance
with classmates.
• Most attackers used firearms, and firearms
were most often acquired from the home.
• Most attackers had experienced
psychological, behavioral, or developmental
symptoms.
• Half of the attackers had interests in
violent topics.
• All attackers experienced social stressors
involving their relationships with peers and/
or romantic partners.
• Nearly every attacker experienced negative
home life factors.
• Most attackers were victims of bullying,
which was often observed by others.
• Most attackers had a history of school
disciplinary actions, and many had prior
contact with law enforcement.
• All attackers exhibited concerning behaviors.
Most elicited concern from others, and most
communicated their intent to attack.
More recently, in 2019, NTAC published the most
comprehensive analysis of school attacks ever produced
by the federal government, titled Protecting America’s
Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School
Violence. The study examined 41 attacks against K-12
schools, perpetrated by current or former students, from 2008
to 2017. By focusing on the backgrounds and behaviors of
the attackers, NTAC was able to provide schools across the
country with a foundational understanding of the behaviors,
circumstances, and personal factors that have led students
to target their classmates and school staff. The information
presented in the report forms the basis for how communities
can use a multidisciplinary threat assessment program
to identify students in distress or exhibiting concerning
behaviors, and intervene with increased treatment or
supports before a tragedy occurs.
As threat assessment programs have become more widely
adopted by K-12 schools, NTAC set forth to examine those
cases when a crisis at school was successfully thwarted.
Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S. Secret Service
Analysis of Plots Against Schools analyzes 67 instances
when a current or former student advanced a plot to attack
their school, but was halted before violence occurred. This
study is NTAC’s latest contribution to a body of research
that demonstrates the path forward for school violence
prevention. The findings presented herein should be
utilized by schools and their surrounding communities to
help intervene earlier and more effectively with students
in distress.
The cases included in this study are only a sample of the
tragedies prevented every day across our country. Put
together, these cases affirm that bystanders coming forward
to report concerning behaviors can save lives. They further
establish how public safety professionals must be deliberate
in how they encourage and facilitate bystander reporting.
When such concerns are brought forward by the public,
those reports must be met with the appropriate degree of
investigation, assessment, and management.
Prevention can be challenging, but with preparation and
collaboration communities can succeed. The U.S. Secret
Service stands ready to support our partners in public safety
with this vital mission. We hope the information contained in
this report will assist with the continued movement toward
more proactive strategies for violence prevention.Averting Targeted School Violence:
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Methodology
INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION
To be included in this study, incidents had to involve plots to conduct a school attack that were averted in the
United States from 2006 to 2018. An averted attack was defined as a plot in which (i) a current or recently former4
K-12 school student (ii) took steps to advance an attack plan (iii) to cause physical injury to, or the death of, at least
one student and/or school employee.
Certain exclusions were used in order to focus this project on incidents of targeted school violence. This study does not
include plots in which the individuals sought to carry out an attack related to gang violence, drug violence, or other
incidents with a strong suggestion of a separate criminal nexus. Additionally, the plotters had to have taken actionable
steps to advance an attack plan to include, but not limited to, conducting surveillance of a school, soliciting others
to assist in the plot, documenting a plan of attack, performing research on previous mass attacks, and attempting to
or successfully acquiring a weapon to be used during the commission of the planned attack. A plotter who simply
expressed an intent to conduct an act of targeted school violence, without taking any action to advance an attack plan,
was not included in the analysis.
To identify averted attacks for this study, NTAC researchers engaged in a systematic review of published reports, public
databases, online lists, and media accounts from 2006 through 2018. Special thanks are extended to the National
Police Foundation for providing data from its Averted School Violence Database to assist with this comprehensive
effort.5 Based on the stated criteria, 67 incidents of averted school attacks, plotted by 100 current or recently former
students, were identified. Incidents were included in the sample regardless of the number of subjects involved, and
regardless of whether the identities of those involved were publicly disclosed. Though most of those in the study were
minors when their plots were discovered, the identities of some plotters were made public depending on the nature of
the charges they faced and the laws within the county or state in which they lived.
CASE RESEARCH AND DATA LIMITATIONS
Researchers obtained information for the 67 identified averted attacks through a rigorous, structured review of open
source information, including news articles and reports from government and private agencies. We considered publicly
available qualitative information to develop data relevant to threat assessment and prevention factors for
each case. Multiple layers of review were applied to every stage of the project to ensure accuracy and reliability of
reported findings.
There were a few limitations in conducting this analysis. In some cases, very little information was found about the
case. The majority of media coverage of these averted attacks focused on the details of the plots; often, very little
was provided on the plotters’ backgrounds. This limited our ability to confirm the presence or absence of certain
background variables.
To account for this variability, when discussing the backgrounds of the plotters, researchers focused on 43 of the 100
plotters for which there was some degree of information available that would address the areas of inquiry. The small
sample size limits the conclusions that can be drawn based on statistical analysis of events and thus in some sections,
statistics were not reported. Though case study research is not designed for establishing generalizable truths or making
predictions, it does allow the reader to learn from the attacks that have been prevented.Averting Targeted School Violence:
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